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PROPERTY RIGHTS AS A PREDICTOR  
FOR THE ECO-EFFICIENCY OF  
PRODUCT-SERVICE SYSTEMS 
 
Abstract 
Over the past decade product service systems (PSS) study has established 
itself as a research field. Most recently scholars have occupied 
themselves with the design and implementation of product service 
systems, which they posit help reduce environmental and economic ineffi-
ciencies. However, extant literature leaves open the question why such 
inefficiencies exist in the first place. This paper proposes opportunistic 
behaviour, bounded rationality, and asymmetric information as possible 
explanations for the existence of the inefficiencies discussed by PSS 
scholars. It continues by exploring five types of property rights and the 
role they can play in increasing eco-efficiency.  
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1 Introduction  
In 1976, Walter Stahel and Geneviève Reday (1981 [1976]) presented the European 
Commission with a groundbreaking report entitled Jobs for Tomorrow – The Potential 
for Substituting Manpower for Energy. The report’s central idea was simple and 
seductive: During the 1970s environmental problems and unemployment had been 
constantly increasing. According to the two authors a throw-away society in which 
products are mass-produced had forced out labour intensive services such as repair and 
maintenance that traditionally kept products in circulation.  
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“A new industrial strategy could consist of a slow shifting of production activities […] from 
manufacturing to a corresponding service sector, concentrating on e.g. long-term leasing, 
maintenance, and reconditioning activities.” (Stahel and Reday, 1981 [1976]: 93) 
Stahel and Reday launched the notion that a shift towards recycling and remanufacturing 
services might help create jobs while saving resources and energy. They hypothesized 
that an economy focused not on products but only on selling the utility of products would 
be more labour-intensive and less energy-demanding than the predominant system. 
Thirty year’s later the ideas of Stahel and Reday have spawned an engaged academic 
debate that most recently coalesced under the umbrella of Product Service Systems (PSS) 
research (Mont, 2000; Ehrenfeld, 2001; Mont & Plepys, 2004; Tukker & Tischner, 
2006b). However, over time the basic inspiration of Stahel and Reday has been given 
many different labels. The earliest publications surfaced in the late 1980s. They 
suggested constructs and conceptual frameworks to describe specific but isolated 
phenomena such as least-cost planning (Lovins, 1985; Lovins, 1989; Moskovitz, 1989; 
Lovins & Lovins, 1991), the utilization-focussed service economy (Stahel, 1994, 1997, 
1998b, 2007), eco-leasing (Braungart, 1991; Braungart & Engelfried, 1992; Braungart, 
1993, 1994a), material intensity per service unit (Schmidt-Bleek, 1993, 1994; 
Hinterberger, Luks, & Schmidt-Bleek, 1997), the longer-life option (Cooper, 1994) or 
function-orientation (Arndt, Leinkauf, Sartorius, & Zundel, 1993; Leinkauf & Zundel, 
1994; Zundel, 1999).  
The following years saw an attempt to integrate these diverging contributions in 
systematic literature reviews and typologies. The Bayreuth Initiative for Business 
Ecology (Hockerts, Geissler, Petmecky, & Seuring, 1993; Axt, Hockerts, Hauch, & 
Petmecky, 1994; Hockerts, Petmecky, Hauch, Seuring, & Schweitzer, 1994; Hockerts, 
1995, 1999) was the first to suggest a typology identifying three types of eco-efficient 
services: product-orientation (take-back, maintenance, life extension services), use-
orientation (eco-leasing, rental, shared use), and need orientation (least-cost planning, 
facility management). Other authors discussing models for eco-efficient services include 
Empacher et al. (1994), Hinterberger et al. (1994), Cogoy (1995), Belz (1999), Manzini 
(2001), Heiskanen and Jalas (2003), Bartolomeo et al (2003), and Halme et al. (2007).  
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An important problem of the early conceptual contributions was the lack of sound 
empirical data. Most authors simply relied on anecdotal evidence or hypothetical cases to 
illustrate their ideas. Only as of the late 1990s have these theoretical contributions been 
empirically substantiated using grounded theory approaches. Empirical studies have been 
conducted on mobility services (Frick, Diez, & Reindl, 1998; Meijkamp, 1998; Schrader, 
1999; Meijkamp, 2000b), services linked to chemicals (Kauffman, Johnson, White, & 
Hearne, 1997; Reiskin, White, Johnson, & Votta, 1999; Stoughton & Votta, 2003), least-
cost planning in infrastructure projects (Eberle, 1996), the leasing of baby prams (Mont, 
Dalhammar, & Jacobsson, 2006), the leasing of electronic and electric equipment 
(Tasaki, Hashimoto, & Moriguchi, 2006), and services in the household (Jalas, 2002; 
Halme, Jasch, & Scharp, 2004; Halme, Anttonen, Hrauda, & Kortman, 2006). 
Furthermore, cross-sectional cases studies were conducted by a number of authors (Fleig, 
1997; Fleig & Krause, 1997; Behrendt, Pfitzner, & Kreibich, 1999). 
In the past decade the focus of research has changed in two important ways. Firstly, 
rather than talking about eco-efficient services researchers have begun to conceptualise 
their research under the new umbrella term of “Product Service Systems” (PSS) 
(Goedkoop, 1999; Mont, 2000; Roy, 2000; Ehrenfeld, 2001; Luiten, Knot, & van der 
Horst, 2001; Manzini et al., 2001; Mont, 2002; Mont & Plepys, 2004; Tukker & 
Tischner, 2006b). Secondly, researchers have become preoccupied with designing and 
implementing PSS systems (Brezet, 2001; Jelsma & Knot, 2002; Morelli, 2003; 
Boughnim & Yannou, 2005; Van Halen, Vezzoli, & Wimmer, 2005; Aurich, Fuchs, & 
Wagenknecht, 2006; Lindahl, Sundin, Shimomura, & Sakao, 2006; Morelli, 2006; 
Tukker & Tischner, 2006a). It is also interesting to note that much of this PSS literature is 
a-historical, rarely referring back to the early literature by Stahel, Lovins, Braungart, or 
Schmidt-Bleek. A notable exception is the work by Mont which is both more 
academically rigorous and grounded in prior literature (Mont, 2002; Mont, 2004; Mont et 
al., 2006).  
The extant literature of over thirty years notwithstanding researchers still lack a coherent 
PSS theory. Quality criteria for theory building (Mintzberg, 1979; Bacharach, 1989; 
Eisenhardt, 1989) require a good theory to have explanatory as well as predictive power. 
 5 
This requires the formulation of parsimonious and testable hypotheses, the identification 
of boundary conditions, and the integration of new theory with the general stream of 
literature. Past PSS literature, which was mostly normative-prescriptive or descriptive-
empirical, has so far not been able to generate such theory. If the depth and breadth of 
PSS theory is to be increased then future research contributions will have to acknowledge 
at least some of the following two questions on a more abstract level: 
• What can explain the existence of inefficiency in the first place? PPS research 
proclaims to aim at increased efficiency. However, very few authors discuss why 
these inefficiencies exist in the first place. Given global competition and the 
increasing concern for environmental impacts PSS theorists have to explain why 
the market has not yet identified the inefficiencies and reacted accordingly. Thirty 
years seems a long time for markets to ignore blatant inefficiencies.  
• Why should services help solve the problem of inefficiencies? It is the main con-
tention of the PSS literature that these inefficiencies can be overcome through a 
shift from products to services. Intuitively this suggestion seems odd, as the 
countries in which services play a more important role (i.e. the developed 
countries) also account for the largest part of environmental destruction. Again 
the PSS literature owes more explanations on why they focus on services as the 
independent variable. 
In the following this paper will suggest the outline of a PSS theory that provides answers 
to these questions. 
 
 
2 Why Resource Allocation Can Be Inefficient 
The work on product service systems falls into the larger stream of eco-efficiency 
literature. Eco-efficiency scholars study under which conditions win-win scenarios exist 
which would allow the simultaneous reduction of environmental impacts and an increase 
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in economic profitability (Schaltegger & Sturm, 1990; Ayres, Flückiger, & Hockerts, 
1995; DeSimone & Popoff, 1997; Schaltegger & Sturm, 1998; Rennings, 2000; 
Hukkinen, 2001; Dyllick & Hockerts, 2002; Bleischwitz, 2003; Figge & Hahn, 2004; 
Young & Tilley, 2006; Mauerhofer, 2008).  
 
 
Insert “Figure 1: Indicators for the Eco-efficiency 
of Product Service Systems” about here 
 
 
Most PSS scholars imply that PSS design can improve eco-efficiency. Figure 1 provides 
an overview of mechanisms through which PSS reportedly increase eco-efficiency 
(adapted from Hockerts, 1999), differentiating four categories of inefficiencies: those 
pertaining to the usable lifetime of a product, those referring to energy and material 
consumption efficiency in the use phase, those concerned with effectiveness in the use 
phase, and finally inefficiencies at the point of disposal.  
1. Authors concerned about product lifetime point towards the fact that the useful 
lifetime of products has decreased in recent decades (Stahel & Reday, 1981 [1976]). 
As a consequence the need for replacement products has increased resulting in 
growing environmental impacts from production and raw material consumption. 
According to these authors eco-efficiency would increase if products could be made 
more durable. In products with fast changing technology one item that is particularly 
important in determining the useful lifetime of a product concerns its upgradeability. 
Although a Pentium I computer might still function today it will only be used if it can 
be easily upgraded to the latest technology. The PSS literature assumes that a move 
from product sales towards services would realign incentives so as to promote 
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increased durability and upgradability of products (i.e. Stahel & Reday, 1981 [1976]; 
Cooper, 1994; Stahel, 1998b; Cooper, 2002). 
2. A second item concerns the efficiency of a product during its use. Both the 
consumption of energy as well as the utilization of consumables impact a product’s 
overall efficiency. However, many products are not designed with use efficiency in 
mind. Where available more efficient products are not adopted as widely as one might 
have expected (Howarth, Haddad, & Paton, 2000). Again PSS solutions are discussed 
as a means to drive use phase efficiency (i.e. Bergsma & Kroese, 1994; Roy, 2000).  
3. A third way proposed by PSS scholars is to increase product effectiveness through 
shared product use (Meijkamp, 1998; Muheim, 1998; Mont, 2004). The higher the 
use intensity of a product the less physical goods are supposed to be needed to meet 
the demands of society. Another strand of literature concerns the potential of 
consulting and insurance services as a means of increasing use effectiveness. PSS 
variants such as “crop insurance” (Smith & Goodwin, 1996) or chemical 
“servicizing” (Reiskin et al., 1999) aim to provide users with the support they need to 
achieve optimal use effectiveness.  
4. A final line of PSS research concerns the efficiency of product disposal. Here PSS are 
believed to ease product take-back logistics while providing producers with 
incentives to design products with recycling and remanufacturing in mind (i.e. 
Braungart & Engelfried, 1992; Stahel, 1998b; Mont et al., 2006). 
The PSS literature’s claim of inefficiencies warrants closer scrutiny. What can explain 
the existence of such inefficiencies in the first place? Economists start from the assump-
tion that in a situation of perfect competition a free market of goods and services will 
automatically lead to an efficient allocation of goods and resources. In such a case win-
win scenarios are impossible. However, as Robinson ([1933] 1950: 5) points out, 
complete competition is a rare occasion. Institutional economics knows three mecha-
nisms which can propagate inefficient systems: opportunistic behaviour, bounded 
rationality, and information asymmetries. 
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2.1 Opportunistic Behaviour  
In the real world market players often possess private information allowing them to 
exploit the ignorance of their counterparts. Williamson (1987) calls this opportunistic 
behaviour. There are multiple types of opportunism: 
• One party may own hidden information and use it to the detriment of other actors 
(i.e. only the producer knows the average lifetime or the effective recyclability of 
a product thus making it impossible for the client to include these points in the 
calculation of a product's true value).  
• A player may have the opportunity to perform hidden action (i.e. when a client 
asks a mechanic to service his product, the mechanic can change more parts than 
would be necessary from a strict maintenance point of view – and thus charge a 
higher price – without the client ever being able to verify this).  
• A party may perform acts of ex-post opportunism (i.e. to encourage clients to buy 
new products the producer of a durable good may discontinue the production of 
replacement parts although there is still a demand). 
Many firms use for example strategies of "planned obsolescence" (Bulow, 1986) whereby 
they reduce the durability of their products on purpose to increase the number of replace-
ment sales. As long as customers cannot judge the durability of a product at the point of 
sale they are not able to counter these strategies. Producers may also ignore issues of 
waste disposal and reusability because their clients are often unaware of the potential 
disposal cost they will incur at the end of the useful lifetime of the material product. On 
the other hand customers at a hotel may leave the lights on all day or the windows open 
while the heat is turned on. Because the actions are hidden the hotel management cannot 
charge the individual causing the extra costs.  
2.2 Bounded Rationality  
Furthermore, the hypothesis of complete competition assumes that all players act rational. 
In reality, however, an assumption of bounded rationality (Simon, 1972) might be more 
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appropriate. Many clients, for example, base their decision to buy a product primarily on 
the price at the point of sale. Economically it would make more sense to consider the full 
cost of ownership (i.e. sale price plus cost of maintenance, disposal and replacement). 
However, even if all information is available many clients do not always consider it in 
their decision making. Kempton and Montgomery (1981), for example, examined the 
methods by which residential consumers computed energy savings from investments in 
efficiency, finding that they systematically underestimated savings. For this very reason 
many producers are wary of increasing the use efficiency of a product (e.g. energy 
efficiency) when this leads to a higher sales price.  
2.3 Information asymmetries 
Even in the absence of opportunism and given the existence of perfectly rational clients 
inefficiencies can exist due to information asymmetries. Many clients, for example, are 
not able to realize the full potential of their products since they lack proper information. 
They use more consumption goods (i.e. detergents, pesticides etc.) than would be 
required to achieve a given goal. Long-living products (i.e. cars, washing machines etc.) 
on the other hand remain idle most of the time. This problem of use effectiveness could 
be overcome at least partly if producers had incentives to help clients increase efficiency.  
 
 
3 Why the Focus Should be on Property Rights Rather Than Services 
"We keep [durable inconsumable commodities] by us even if we do not want them at the mo-
ment. But their utility will of course, be increased the more often we can arrange to use 
them, so that it is often better to hire, or to buy and sell, or to make various arrangements 
for common usership." 
Stanley JEVONS ([1871] 1965) 
Over the past decade an increasing number of PSS scholars have identified services as a 
potential solution to address the environmental and economic inefficiencies described 
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above. However, no theoretical framework has been proposed that would explain why 
PSS should be a useful tool to achieve that goal. This paper uses institutional economics 
to abstract from the product-to-services argument. It focuses particularly on the redistri-
bution of property rights as a means to create better incentives for producers to increase 
the efficiency of their products. As will be illustrated the redistribution of property rights 
can induce producers and clients to act efficiently even in the presence of opportunism, 
bounded rationality and information asymmetries.  
Institutional theory differentiates five types of property rights (Furubotn & Pejovich, 
1972; Silver, 1989): the right to retain profits, the right to maintain and operate a product, 
the right to dispose of a product, the right to exclude others, and the right to use a 
product. It is important to note that the first three of these rights also include important 
obligations, namely the duty to cover losses, the obligation to maintain a product, and the 
duty to pay for the disposal of a product at the end of its useful life. While we are used to 
exchange these rights and obligations as a bundle at the point of sale it is of course 
possible to make separate agreements for each property right. As will be shown in the 
following each property right and duty has particular impacts on the inefficiencies 
described above. Jointly they are able to describe the different effects attributed to 
product service systems by extant literature.  
 
3.1 The right to retain profits / the obligation to cover losses 
Traditionally all rights concerning profit retention are transferred to the client at the point 
of sale. However, by letting the producer retain part of this right it is possible to create 
incentives for the manufacturer not only at the point of sale, but over the whole life cycle. 
This can for example be reached through leasing or rental arrangements (i.e. Stahel & 
Reday, 1981 [1976]; Braungart & Engelfried, 1992; Mont et al., 2006). By letting the 
producer participate in the value created by a product during its use phase such PSS 
variants encourage the producer to increase the lifetime of products. This strategy helps 
discourage opportunistic behaviour (such as a strategy of planned obsolescence). The 
longer a product lives, the higher the benefits of the producer will be. 
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A second option discussed by PSS scholars concerns the least-cost planning model 
proposed by Lovins (1991). In this approach electricity and water utilities are investing in 
energy and water conserving measures at their clients’ homes. In return they receive the 
right to participate in parts of the savings resulting from those investments. PSS scholars 
have described similar approaches in the chemical industry (i.e. Kauffman et al., 1997; 
Stahel, 1998a; Reiskin et al., 1999).  
But producers might also be held responsible for future losses. Consider the example of 
architects. Usually they will aim to keep the building costs low to win contracts. This 
might, however, lead to suboptimal heating standards as a result of which the mainte-
nance of a building might be far more costly (Eberle, 2000: 179). However, building 
contracts might contain a clause whereby architects would have to pay a fine if heating 
costs exceed a defined industry average amount. This would ensure that energy efficiency 
is at the top their mind when designing the building.  
 
3.2 The right / obligation to maintain and operate a product  
If a company sells a product this implies normally that the right to change a product and 
the obligation to maintain it are transferred to the clients. However, the client might not 
be best suited to operate and maintain a product efficiently, particularly if the operational 
efficiency is partly impacted through design decisions by the producer. By retaining the 
obligation to maintain and operate a product the producer can be motivated to help 
increase efficiency either through improved design or by helping clients via training and 
maintenance services. Facility management services are an example for such types of 
PSS. Due to its specialised knowledge a facility management company is more likely to 
pay attention to energy efficiency in the buildings it manages than the average tenant 
would.  
Firms can also offer clients protection against the risks underlying the usage of a material 
product. Often the risk aversion of clients creates considerable inefficiencies. Rather than 
running the risk to be out of a car in a crucial moment people will refrain from giving up 
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their own vehicle. Farmers tend to use much more pesticide than would be economical 
simply to avoid the loss of income in the rare event of a pest occurrence. By relocating 
this risk one can not only increase the environmental efficiency of product use. A car 
sharing company, for example, may offer guaranteed taxi services or access to rental cars 
in the rare occasion that no car sharing vehicle is available. Pesticide producers may offer 
crop insurance along with the product thus offering to reimburse the few farmers that 
actually lose their crop (Braungart, 1994b). 
 
3.3 The right / obligation to dispose of a product  
What is true for the maintenance of a product can also be applied to its disposal. Traditi-
onally the cost of disposal is borne by the client. However, this implies also that he can 
reap all benefits from material recovery. In practice this means that producers have no 
incentive to design easy to recycle products. Those that do, on the other hand, usually do 
not benefit from a positive residual value as clients will rather sell the old product for a 
profit to other recycling outfits. By relocating the obligation of disposal to the producer 
one can generate incentives for efficient design as well as making sure that valuable 
materials find their way back to the producer for remanufacturing and recycling. Such 
take-back services may also have economic advantages: They may help with follow-up 
sales by bringing client and provider together at point of disposal.  
Among all elements of PSS strategies it is the take-back (Ayres, Ferrer, & Van 
Leynseele, 1997; Fishbein, 2000) and remanufacturing potential (Stahel, 1998b; Mont et 
al., 2006) that is probably the most promising. Regulation in recent years has increasingly 
used the tool of reassigning the duty of disposal back to the producer (Fishbein, 2000; 
Matthews, 2004; Nakajima & Vanderburg, 2006).  
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3.4 The right to exclude others  
A major property right lies in the possibility of owners to exclude others from the usage 
of a product. If companies retain this right they may accordingly offer sharing facilities. 
In these cases different clients may use the same product thus reducing idle time and 
increasing efficiency. A second possibility lies in a product pool service. A pool contains 
a number of different product variations (e.g. from two seater to limousine in the case of 
a car pool). Thus clients can chose the product that best reflects their current needs (rather 
than driving the family limousine at every occasion). 
Scholars have discussed many different examples of such PSS variants: Car-sharing 
(Meijkamp, 1999, 2000a, b; Schrader & Koch, 2001; Hockerts, 2007), the joint use of 
power tools (Mont, 2003), and shared washing facilities (Garcilaso, Jordan, Kumar, 
Hutchins, & Sutherland, 2007) are just some of the possible applications of this property 
right. 
 
3.5 The right to use a product  
The right to use a product is traditionally assigned at the point of sale and is often 
associated with a considerable amount of fixed cost. The owner of a car, for example, 
loses part of the value of a car due to age even if the vehicle sits in the parking lot all day. 
The same is true for ownership taxes. By offering a service, the right to use a product can 
be dissociated from its ownership. From the viewpoint of the user, formerly fixed cost 
can become variable.  
This has important consequences for decision-making as the user can chose between 
different options on the basis of the true cost of a single usage. Thus the comparison 
between public transport and individual transport by car may come to a different 
conclusion than it does in the case of car ownership where fixed cost must be regarded as 
sunk cost. Langendorf (cited in Hockerts, 2003) speaks in this context of the “price 
illusion of car-ownership” which car-sharing can help undo. 
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4 Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the PSS literature by suggesting property rights as the key 
mechanism through which product service systems increase eco-efficiency. Five property 
rights are identified as building blocks of product service systems: the right to retain 
profits, the right to maintain and operate a product, the right to dispose of a product, the 
right to exclude others, and the right to use a product. 
This paper proposes that it’s the redistribution of property rights between producers and 
users that makes up the core element of product service systems (PSS). Rearranging 
property rights is seen as the mechanism by which incentives are set to reduce inefficien-
cies. The focus of intention thus moves from the product/services divide towards the 
constellation of property rights. By unpacking the concept of Product Service Systems 
the above model provides a unifying language to describe such different PSS examples as 
eco-leasing, least-cost planning, and product durability strategies. This has several 
important consequences.  
Firstly, it allows to identify genuinely different cause-effect relationships that in recent 
PSS literature have been lost in the big picture. Different property rights address different 
sets of opportunism, bounded rationality, and information asymmetry. Future research 
could profitably probe the sources of inefficiencies in different industries. Moreover, it 
would be interesting to understand the importance of these inefficiencies. Are we talking 
about a few percentage points or is there a much larger eco-efficiency potential hidden?  
A second line of research might want to explore the relevance of certain property rights 
in different industries. While the disposal obligation might be most relevant for makers of 
electronic goods it could be the right to share in future gains from efficiency increases 
that will be a main driver for utility companies. A better understanding is needed which 
property rights have the highest impact on eco-efficiency in different industry settings.  
Thirdly, the model proposed here begs the question of policy making. Implicitly most 
PSS literature assumes that PSS will be adopted through voluntary measures. Given 
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enough information, so the hypothesis, producers will be likely to integrate PSS rationale 
into their research and design activities. After all they are likely to participate in the 
efficiency gains triggered by the PSS. However, in reality we see very few 
comprehensive PSS innovations. The case of disposal obligations raises the question 
what role government policy should play. Whereas, most PSS elements have remained 
irrelevant it is take-back legislation that has caused the most profound transformation of 
industrial systems in the past decade. Does this indicate that more legislation on the 
different property rights is needed?  
By focussing our attention on property rights as a key variable the approach proposed 
here allows us to better understand the similarities and differences between various 
product service systems. This should primarily help researchers to improve the analysis 
of PSS. In the long run these findings should hopefully help improve on PSS design and 
implementation. 
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Figure 1: Indicators for the Eco-efficiency of Product Service Systems 
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